Abstract. Adaptive security has recently been a very active area of research. In this paper we consider how to achieve adaptive security in the additive-sharing based proactive RSA protocol (from Crypto97). This protocol is the most efficient proactive RSA protocol for a constant number of shareholders, yet it is scalable, i.e., it provides reasonable asymptotic efficiency given certain constraints on the corruption threshold. It is based on organizing the shareholders in a certain design (randomly generated, in the asymptotic case) of families of committees and establishing communications based on this organization. This structure is very different than polynomial-based proactive RSA protocols, and the techniques for achieving adaptive security for those protocols do not apply. Therefore, we develop new techniques for achieving adaptive security in the additive-sharing based proactive RSA protocol, and we present complete proofs of security.
Introduction
Distributed cryptosystems provide for security and availability of a private key through distribution of shares of the key, coupled with a mechanism in which some number (a threshold) of shareholders are able to jointly compute the cryptographic function using their shares of the key, while a smaller number of possibly misbehaving parties are prevented from disrupting this computation, or computing the cryptographic function on their own. A distributed cryptosystem achieves proactive security if at least a threshold of shareholders must misbehave (or be compromised) in a specified time period in order to compromise the security or availability of the system. A distributed cryptosystem achieves adaptive security if it is secure against an adaptive adversary, that is, an adversary that may take actions based on the entire available history, including ciphertexts sent during the protocol. (We say such distributed cryptosystems are adaptivelysecure.) More complicated protocols are typically required to achieve adaptive security, and proving that a protocol is adaptively secure is typically more difficult than proving that a protocol is secure against a non-adaptive adversary.
In this paper we consider the additive-sharing based proactive RSA protocol [FGMY97] . This is the most efficient proactive RSA protocol for a constant number of shareholders, and is also scalable. Unlike some solutions, it guarantees that the threshold value is maintained throughout, even when some participants are unavailable. Therefore it is an attractive solution for practical situations. It is based on organizing the shareholders in a "design" consisting of families of committees of shareholders. We modify this protocol to achieve adaptive security while maintaining the same organization and the basic protocol structure.
History of Threshold Proactive and Adaptive Systems:
Threshold schemes for discrete log and RSA based cryptosystems were presented in [DF89, B88, F89, DF91, DDFY92, FD92] . Robust schemes that assure the correctness and timeliness of the cryptographic operation were presented in [GJKR, FGY96, GJKR96, Sh00] . Some of these protocols make additional system requirements or additional constraints on certain cryptographic parameters beyond what is required for the corresponding non-distributed cryptosystems. This is not a criticism, since such constraints sometimes allow a cleaner or more efficient distributed solution. For example, to allow an efficient non-interactive robustness check in [GJKR96] , secure keys are required at the combiner. Without this, every participant must have keys to verify the operation of other participant which makes the scheme much more expensive (i.e., quadratic in the number of participants). The solution of [GJKR96] , and the algebraically-pleasing solution of [Sh00] , also place constraints on the RSA keys which can be used. (We note that RSA keys constrained in such a manner cannot be generated using the distributed key generation methods in [BF97, FMY98] .) Similar constraints are made in the early heuristic protocol of [DF91] (which [FMY00] builds on).
The notion of proactive security [OY91, CH94, HJKY95, HJJKY96] was developed to cope with a mobile adversary, i.e., an adversary that may compromise all servers over the lifetime of a system, but fewer than a given threshold at any particular time. An RSA based proactive scheme (which does not achieve optimal resilience in the asymptotic case) was given in [FGMY97] . It is based on additive sharing and is the one we concentrate on herein. A scheme based on polynomial sharing that achieves optimal resilience was given in [FGMY97b] . A scheme that combined additive and polynomial sharing was offered by [R98] , but it has the sometimes undesirable property that the threshold value may be dynamically reduced due to occasional unavailability of possibly honest shareholders.
The importance of developing protocols that are provably secure against a fully-adaptive adversary has been discussed in [BeHa92, CFGN96, B97] in the context of general distributed computation. Adaptively secure (polynomial sharing) threshold schemes were given in [FMY99, FMY99b] , and in [CGJKR] , which is extended in [JL00] . The RSA based scheme in [CGJKR] seems to be an n-outof-n system, since all parties need to compute together after each signature.
Our Contribution:
We present an adaptively secure version of the original additive-sharing based proactive RSA. We present a complete careful proof of its security and robustness without making any additional system requirements or any constraints on the cryptographic parameters. Our version exploits the organization and protocol structure of the original protocol. It is only slightly less efficient, yet it is provably secure against a fully-adaptive adversary. The scheme is very efficient for small size system, yet it is scalable asymptotically to tolerate any fraction of malicious shareholders bounded away from half (e.g. 1/3). It can be used with general RSA keys and can be initiated distributedly.
Discussion of Techniques Used:
We distribute the RSA private key using many r-out-of-r additive threshold schemes as in [F89] . The additive shares are distributed to certain subsets of servers where the construction of subsets is taken from [AGY95] . By using a simple additive threshold scheme [F89] as the basis of our system, we simplify the domain over which sharing is done (when compared with [DDFY92]), and enable the verification and re-randomization of shares by the servers. Also, this method is what makes the system suitable for settings with a constant number of servers. To provide robustness, we employ the idea of witness-based cryptographic program checking [FGY96] which extends Blum's methodology of program result checking [Bl88] to a system where the checker itself is not trusted by the program. Finally to show that the distribution of shares is secure, we use a simulatability argument similar to one that was put forth in the static distribution of RSA [DDFY92] .
For proving security against a fully-adaptive adversary, we must show that the protocol is simulatable. A problem arises if the simulator must simulate the actions of a servers whose shares are unknown, and those actions may commit to the share value. Then if the adversary decides to corrupt that server, it can distinguish between the real protocol and the simulation. In our proactive protocol we use the erasure primitive to maintain security, and we assume that uncorrupted shareholders will erase information when specified by the protocol. In fact, this assumption is required for the system to be secure against a mobile adversary. (In other words, in this security setting, the erasure primitive is as important as any other computational primitive.) Thus, we can substitute non-committing encryption [BeHa92] (which uses erasure) for probabilistic encryption to remove the commitments from the encryptions.
Allowing erasures may seem to be enough to prove security. However, it is not sufficient, since there are other share commitments in the protocol, namely, the partial signatures combined for signing and the witness-based cryptographic program checking used for robustness. This is all publicly available information that must be made accessible to any arbitrary party (a gateway) in order for that party to be able to produce the correct function result from the partial results. We thus require new ideas which are developed here. We use informationtheoretically secure witnesses for robustness maintenance, which allows a simulator to "spread the fraud" over all servers, instead of concentrating it on a given shareholder with a single "bogus commitment." Then we show how to remove the share commitments from signatures through blinding. In this case, we still have bogus commitments, but we show that the probability of the simulator successfully fooling the adversary is high enough that (limited) backtracking can be employed to generate realistic-looking views for the adversary.
Other then the above changes the adaptively-secure protocol is compatible with the original Crypto97 protocol. (This enables a system designer to imple-ment both and decide at configuration/run time which variant is applicable to his setting).
Model and Definitions

The RSA Function
First we define the RSA function. For naming convenience, we will assume our system is used for direct RSA signing of messages; however, the same protocol could be used for decryption. Our results simply concern the application of the RSA function in its assumed intractable direction as a one-way function (as assumed in protocols with formal security proofs which employ RSA, e.g. [ACGS]).
The Model
Now we define our Proactive RSA system.
The Participants: The participants in our system are (1) l servers {s 1 , . . . , s l }, (2) a trusted dealer D, and (3) a gateway G. The dealer D generates an RSA instance (e, d, N ) , distributes shares of d among the l servers during an initialization phase, and then does not participate any further. The gateway G is used to broadcast messages to be signed to the servers and to combine their partial signatures into the final signature. (Note that G is not trusted, and in fact is not really necessary except for convenience.) As the protocol is running, the servers will be classified as follows: A server is compromised if its secret is known to the adversary. A server is corrupted if it is controlled by the adversary. (We assume all corrupted servers are compromised.) We refer to a server as good if it is uncorrupted, and actively participates in a protocol. We refer to a server as bad if it is compromised. (Note that some servers may be neither good nor bad.) We assume 1 λ(N ) = lcm(P − 1, Q − 1) is the smallest integer such that any element in Z * N raised by λ(N ) is the identity element. RSA is typically defined using φ(N ), the number of elements in Z that all uncorrupted servers receive all messages that are broadcast, and retrieve the information from messages encrypted with a public key, if they know the corresponding private key. We also assume that if they are active in a protocol, they participate honestly. We will show that our protocols perform correctly even if only the good servers and corrupted servers are active. The Communication Model: The communication model presented here is similar to [HJKY95] . All participants communicate via an authenticated bulletin board [CF85] in a synchronized manner. We assume that the adversary cannot jam communication. The board assumption models an underlying basic communication protocol (authenticated broadcasts) and allows us to disregard the low-level technical details. Time periods: Time is divided into time periods which are determined by the common global clock (e.g., a day, a week, etc.). There are two types of time periods repeated in sequence: an update period (odd times) and an operational period (even times). During an operational period, the servers can cooperatively sign messages using the current key shares. During the update period the servers engage in an interactive update protocol. At the end of an update period the servers hold new shares which are used during the following operational period. (Technical note: we consider a server that is corrupted during an update phase as being corrupted during both its adjacent periods. This is because the adversary could learn the shares used in both the adjacent operational periods.) System Management: We assume that a server that is determined to be corrupted by a majority of active servers can be refreshed (i.e., erased and rebooted, or perhaps replaced by a new server with a blank memory) by some underlying system management. This is a necessary assumption for dealing with corrupted servers in any proactive system. Note that when we deal with a mobile adversary, the set of corrupted servers does not necessarily monotonically increase over time. Also note that the above definitions also apply to compromising or preventing honest participation by servers. Threshold schemes are often described in terms of withstanding coalitions of "k-out-of-l" corrupted servers. In our notation, that would correspond to withstanding a (k, k + 1, l)-restricted adversary.
The actions of an adversary at any time may include submitting messages to the system to be signed, corrupting or compromising servers, and broadcasting arbitrary information on the communication channel. The following definition describes different criteria on which an adversary may base its actions. We assume that the adversary stores all messages that were broadcast on the public channel and the contents of all memories of servers that it can view. (Naturally, all this information is time-tagged.) Assuming S is the system being attacked, and A is the adversary, we call this stored information view S A,L , where L is the list of messages that are submitted to S to be signed. (Note that the signatures will be implicit in the view.) system, etc.)
Properties
We say that a function f (h) is negligible if for any polynomial poly(·), there is an h such that for h > h , f (h) < 1/poly(h). Now we define what it means for a system to be robust. In these definitions we assume the security parameter η is large enough so that the analysis holds.
Definition 5. (Robustness) Let η be the security parameter. A system S is a (k , k, l)-robust proactive RSA system if it contains a polynomial-time protocol SIG (run by the servers) such that for any probabilistic polynomial-time (k , k, l)-
restricted adversary A, with all but negligible probability, assuming (e, d, N ) is the RSA instance generated by the dealer, for every α ∈ [0, N] that is submitted to be signed (during an operational period), the servers can compute α d mod N using SIG.
Next we define what it means for the RSA system to be secure (RSA is treated as a one-way function). 
In the next section we describe a proactive RSA system which is (k , k, l)-secure and (k , k, l)-robust, assuming a fully adaptive adversary.
The Adaptively-Secure Protocol
Outline
At the start an assignment of servers to committees and families is chosen (as in [AGY95]). Specifically, for given values m, r, and c, servers are randomly assigned to mr committees that are evenly split between m families, such that each committee has c servers assigned to it. (Note that each server may be assigned to multiple committees.) This random assignment may be performed by the trusted dealer, or by the servers themselves. The values m, r, and c are chosen such that with high probability each set of k servers can obtain all the shares from some family, and no set of k servers can obtain all the shares from any family.
After the assignment of servers to committees, the dealer D generates an RSA instance (e, d, N ) , and distributes additive shares of d to the committees in each family as in [F89] . Thus each family obtains an r-out-of-r sharing of the key. In the original protocol a 0 i,j is the share given to the jth committee in family i by the dealer, and more generally, a 2t i,j is the share corresponding to the jth committee in family i during operational period 2t. During an operational period (say period 2t), when a message M needs to be signed, the servers possessing a 2t i,j can produce the value (the partial signature) M a 2t i,j mod N . Because of the assignment choice above, at least one of the m families will produce correct values for all committees, and therefore, for at least one i, the gateway G can compute the RSA signature of M using the formula
During an update period (a) the good shares are renewed and (b) corrupted shares are recovered. The basic technique to renew and recover shares is by creating shares of shares and distributing the shares of shares appropriately.
To provide for robustness throughout the protocol, we use a witnesses (similar to [FGY96,GJKR96]) for each share. These witness are used to check partial signatures and to check that the renewal of shares in the update period is performed correctly.
To allow adaptive adversary we take a few extra steps, to assure simulatability of the protocol. We use information theoretic commitments and witness process. We carefully evaluate results. But, the protocol organization and structure remains as in the original protocol, which is our main achievement. (We note that sometimes, adapting a protocol may be harder than having the freedom to design it afresh. Also, we do not change the basic model assumptions: threshold requirements, and the notion of threshold as some earlier protocols did).
Remark: In all of these subprotocols, messages are put on an authenticated bulletin board. One implementation is having every message signed by the sender using a secure signature scheme, and ignoring any message with an invalid signature. We include the renewal of individual signature keys in the description of our protocol. Note that we still need an initial authentication token to be available for recovering servers. We will henceforth assume that all the signed messages originate at the correct server; otherwise, the assumption about the security of the underlying signature scheme is violated.
Notation: In our protocol description, messages are presented inside brackets. Messages include a "message-tag" which is a self-explanatory (mnemonic) description of the role of the message, the tag is followed by the message content.
Initialization Phase
Families and Committees: The assignment we describe is a slight generalization of [AGY95]. This assignment can be performed by the trusted dealer, or by the servers themselves. Let S = {s 1 , . . . , s l } be the set of servers and F = {F 1 , . . . , F m } be the set of families, where each F i = {C i,1 , . . . , C i,r } is a set of committees of servers. Each committee is of size c. Let I = {1, . . . , m} and J = {1, . . . , r} be the indices of families and committees, respectively. The parameters m, r, and c are chosen such that the result will be a (k , k, l)-terrific assignment, that is, one that obeys the following properties for any set of "bad" servers B ⊆ S with |B| ≤ k and any set of "good" servers E ⊆ S with |E| ≥ k:
1. For all i ∈ I, there exists a j ∈ J such that B∩C i,j = ∅. (For each family there is one committee with no bad servers which we call an excellent committee.) 2. For at least 90 percent of i ∈ I, for all j, E ∩ C i,j = ∅. (In 90 percent of the families, all committees have at least one good server. We call a family F i with this property a good family.)
Let σ = k /l and let τ = k/l. Given l, q, p, and security parameter η ≥ max{2l + 2, 100}, we will set c = {2 log η/ log(
/η, and m = 10η. Note that all of these values are polynomial in η as long as τ − σ is greater than some constant (i.e., as long as the gap between the number of good servers and bad servers is at least a constant fraction of l).
Lemma 7 ([AGY95]). A randomly chosen assignment is -terrific with overwhelming probability.
The proof is given in the appendix. We can control the probability of obtaining a non--terrific assignment to be smaller than that of breaking the RSA function given the security parameter. Note that once we have terrific assignment, any choice of "bad servers" is allowed-which is important in the mobile adversary case.
In practical adaptations where a small (constant) numbers of servers is expected the randomized construction can be replaced be a deterministic design. For example:
-a (1,2,3)-terrific assignment can be made with 1 family with 3 committees:
({1,2},{1,3},{2,3}); -a (2,3,4)-terrific assignment can be made with two families, each with 3 committees: ({1,2},{3},{4}) and ({1},{2},{3,4}); -a (2,3,5)-terrific assignment can be made with three families, each with 3 committees: ({1,2},{3,4},{5}), ({1,3},{2,5},{4}) and ({2,4},{3,5},{1}); and -a (2,4,6)-terrific assignment can be made with two families, each with 3 committees: ({1,2},{3,4},{5,6}) and ({2,3},{4,5},{6,1}).
Initialization Phase
In this phase, only the Share Distribution protocol is changed from the Basic Protocol. The change is simply the inclusion of companion shares. Share Distribution Protocol:
1. The dealer generates p, q, e, d, as in RSA: N = pq and ed ≡ 1 mod λ(N ). and broadcasts [DISTRIBUTE.1, N, e, g, h, y] . 4. The dealer next generates the shares of the secret: For each (i, j) ∈ I ×J \{r}, the dealer generates a
The dealer generates
d ∈ R [1, N 2 ]. 3. The dealer generates 2 g, h ∈ R [2, N − 2], sets y = g d h d mod N (Pedersen commitment to d),0 i,j ∈ R [−ρ, ρ] and w 0 i,j ∈ R [−Nρ, Nρ]. Then it sets a 0 i,r = d − j∈J\{r} a 0 i,j and w 0 i,r = d − j∈J\{r} w 0 i,j .
The dealer generates the Pedersen commitment to the shares: For each i ∈ I
and j ∈ J, the dealer sets i,j ≡ g
The dealer broadcasts the private check shares and the encrypted shares:
. 7. Every server checks for each family i ∈ I that j∈J i,j ≡ y mod N and each server in C i,j checks the correctness of its public share, namely that
Every server sets the signature family indicator f 0 = 0, and for each (i, j) ∈ I × J, every server sets b
Recently, a method for generating a distributed RSA key was developed by [BF97] . Later a robust distributed RSA key generation system was developed [FMY98] . We note that, given this distributed generation, we could distributively perform steps 2-7 (with the need to replicate super logarithmic number of random elements g's and generate them and their corresponding h's distributedly). Thus, we could remove the trusted dealer assumption from our proactive RSA model. The initial assignment can also be chosen distributedly via a coin flipping protocol by the shareholders. (A discussion on distributed initialization is omitted from this version).
Now that the system is initialized, we have to describe the the signing protocol and the proactive update (renewal) protocol.
Notation: For each (i, j) ∈ I × J, ENC i,j (α) will denote an encryption of α using the public key of C i,j . For all s ∈ S, ENC s (α) will denote a probabilistic encryption of α using the public key of server s. Remember, in our model the adversary is computationally bounded and thus it cannot get more than a negligible advantage in computing any function of α by seeing its encryption. For succinctness, let ρ = Nm 2 r 2 cψ(η), where ψ() is an agreed upon superpolynomial function. This value ρ will be used to compute the possible range of secret shares in each period.
Signature Protocol (Operational Period 2t)
This is the protocol to be followed when the gateway obtains a message M to be signed in period 2t. It differs from the Basic Protocol in that families work sequentially to try to generate a signature, instead of in parallel. Also, in each family there is a re-randomization of the shares (in steps 2(a)-(h) below, which are just like the share renewal protocol but only involving one family).
As in the Basic Protocol, we use the fact that
i,j mod N . During an operational period (say period 2t), when a message M needs to be signed, only one family will initially attempt to generate a signature. This will be indicated by the signature family indicator f 2t . Let i = f 2t . If F i is unable to generate a signature, then all its data is erased, f 2t is incremented, and the next family will attempt to generate a signature. This is repeated until some family succeeds in generating a signature. (Success is guaranteed by the assignment choice, which was shown to include good families.) When a family attempts to generate a signature, it will randomize its shares, and use the randomized shares for computing the partial signatures. The signal family indicator f 2t is set to the family that should be attempting to generate a signature. There are two possible cases: (1) the family has already signed at this stage, and thus the randomized shares have been produced already and the current signature session can reuse them, or (2) the family has to start by re-randomizing the shares.
The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. i,j and anything else produced at previous steps in this protocol, f 2t is incremented, and we go to Step 2 (thus proceeding to the next family). Note that if a signature is not computed, family F i must already be bad so erasing the remaining shares does not affect the system. Note also that there are good families, and such a family will produce a valid signature.
Renewal Protocols (Update Period 2t + 1)
Only the Share Renewal/Lost Share Recovery protocol changes from the Basic Protocol, whereas individual key renewal and committee key renewal do not. If the non-committing encryption scheme from [BeHa92] is used, the key renewal phases include generation of pseudorandom pads, and the actual keys are erased. We refer the reader to [BeHa92] for details. Share Renewal/Lost Share Recovery: The only change from the Basic Protocol is to perform renewal on the w 2t i,j shares (the companion shares) along with the a 2t i,j shares. Now we give the protocol:
Public verification of of re-shared witnesses against old witnesses:
Every server verifies, for all (i, j, i ) ∈ I × J × I and all s ∈ C i,j , that 
Proof of Adaptive Security
We claim that:
Theorem 8. The proactive RSA system above is (k , k, l)-secure against a fully adaptive adversary.
We prove the security of our system in two stages. First, we construct a simulator which produces views of the adversary in polynomial time (in Subsection 4.1). Then (in Subsection 4.2) we show how, using the simulator, one reduces the security of the RSA function to the security of a slightly modified version of our scheme against the adaptive mobile adversary. This slightly modified system simply gives more information to the adversary, so it is trivial to conclude the security of our actual system. Also, we actually use a more stringent definition of security in which not only should it be difficult for an adversary to generate a signature for a random message, but it also should be difficult to generate the discrete log of g with respect to h, and vice-versa. More concretely, Definition 9. (Security) Let η be the security parameter. Let key generator GE define a family of RSA functions (i.e., (e, d, N ) 
is an RSA instance with security parameter η). Let S(e, d, N, g, h ) denote a system S in which the RSA instance (e, d, N ) was chosen by the trusted dealer D using GE and Then S is a (k , k, l) 
We will use the following lemma, which can be proven using the RSA security assumption.
Lemma 10. Let η be the security parameter. Let modulus generator GE define a family of modulus generating functions (i.e., N ← GE(1 η ) be an RSA modulus with security parameter η). For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
Proof. Similar to [B84] .
In the slightly modified system we consider, we assume the adversary is given some extra information each time a set of shares is erased. We assume that after the shares are erased for a given family, the adversary is given the values of shares and "randomized signature shares" from all committees in that family except for the highest numbered committee (hereinafter called the designated committee) in which no servers were corrupted (up to that point in the period). Additionally, the adversary is given all values used in constructing those shares, and all values produced from those shares, i.e., the c,c, v andṽ values. Finally, for any families that did not generate randomized signature shares, random ones are generated and revealed to the adversary, except for the ones for the designated committee. Thus the adversary always obtains from each family all but one committee's share and "randomized signature share." The choice of this committee is a deterministic function of the adversary's random bits and the adversary's view of the protocol to that point.
The Simulator
Here we construct sim to simulate the view of A in the (secure-channel) system we describe above. We assume the random bits of A are fixed. The inputs to the simulator are an RSA public key (e, N ), generators g and h, 3 the description of the adversary A, and a history H.
Whenever f 2t is set to a value i, sim chooses j ∈ R J, indicating that sim is guessing that C i,j is the designated committee in F i for period 2t. Note that sim has exactly a 1/r probability of correctly guessing the one designated committee in F i for period 2t. If the guess is incorrect, sim repeatedly backtracks to the point where f 2t is set to i, randomly guessing which committee will be the designated committee, until it guesses correctly. Recall that after backtracking, the view of A could change, and since A is fully adaptive, it could corrupt different servers. Thus the designated committee may change. Still, sim will have exactly a 1/r probability of guessing correctly each time it backtracks, and thus there will be no bias in the simulation with respect to the corruptions made by A. There are m families, and the guesses are made sequentially. Therefore, sim backtracks at most an average of mr times per period.
From now on, we will assume that sim guesses the designated committee correctly. Below we discuss details of the simulations of the subprotocols. Note that the simulations of the key renewal protocol, the lost share detection protocol, and the share renewal/lost share recovery protocol are all exactly the same as the normal protocols.
Share Distribution Simulation:
The Share Distribution Simulation is similar to Share Distribution, except that d is chosen to be 0. We let a -In step 3, for the family F i that is currently attempting to sign M and designated committee C i,j , each s ∈ C i,j computes (with sim's help, using the history
Security Proofs
The outline of the full security proof is as follows. We will first prove security in the secure channels model. Specifically, in Lemma 11 we will prove that the view of an adversary attacking our simulation of the protocol is statistically indistinguishable from the view of that adversary attacking the real protocol. Then, in Lemma 16, we show that statistical indistinguishability in the secure channels model implies polynomial indistinguishability when using non-committing encryption for sending private messages. Finally, we prove the theorem by showing that breaking the security of the protocol implies breaking RSA.
Simulation over Secure Channels For the rest of this section, let S be the system from the previous section with the modification described at the beginning of this section, and let sim be the simulator described above.
Lemma 11. Assuming secure channels, for any probabilistic (k , k, l)-restricted fully adaptive adversary A, view sim(e,N,A,H,g,h)
A,L is statistically indistinguishable from view
, where
Proof. To simplify the proof we assume that A's random bits are fixed. We will show that, for every assignment of A's random bits, the two views are indistinguishable. We will assume that the protocol is run through period 2T .
Say that, for each family
is the designated committee.
For the sake of a consistent representation, let X be the random variable consisting of the cross product of the values from the set 
Proposition 12. diff(view sim(e,N,A,H,g,h)
A,L
, view
Proof. The remaining parts of the view of A are exactly determined by X (or X sim in the simulation) g, h, the history tape, and A's random bits, and the history tape and A's random bits are assumed fixed. The remaining parts of the view therefore make no contribution to the statistical difference of the views.
We call the cross-products generated by X and X sim tuples. Note that they include * 's in certain locations to indicate the value is unspecified (unknown to A). Let Z (Z sim ) be the completely specified tuples for the real (simulated) protocol. Of course, Z and Z sim can be distinguished simply by examining the initial share values for one family F i and determining whether they sum to 0 or not.
Say that two tuples are overlapping, if for all positions in which neither has a * , the values at those positions are the same. Given that A is a fully adaptive adversary, even though the random bits of A are fixed, tuples generated from X and X sim may have * 's in differing positions. As an example, assume the tuples generated from X have length 5. Then one tuple might be (125, * , 30, 39, 27) . If the adversary were not fully adaptive, the position with the * would be the same for every other tuple in X. However, since the adversary is fully adaptive, another tuple in X might be (32, 35, * , 39, 27) . These two tuples are not overlapping, but the tuple (125, 35, * , 39, 27) would overlap with the first tuple.
The tuples in X, X sim , Z, and Z sim can be logically separated into subtuples of length r corresponding to the values that the r committees in a family receive during some protocol. In each sub-tuple of length r, there will be either zero or one * , and a sub-tuple with no * indicates that the value shared to that committee was previously known. (This can occur during share renewal, for example, when a share known to the adversary is split into shares of shares.) Proposition 13. Given that the random bits of A are fixed, no distinct tuples in X ∪ X sim , may be overlapping.
Proof. Consider two distinct tuples in X ∪ X sim , and consider the runs of the protocol that produced those tuples. Consider the first time that the behavior of A diverges in these two runs. Before this time, the positions of * 's in the tuples must be the same. Remember that the random bits of A are fixed, so its actions are only dependent on its view, and when a designated committee is chosen, it is a deterministic function of A's random bits and A's view of the protocol to that point. Therefore, the values at some position in the two distinct tuples must be different, and thus the tuples are not overlapping.
Proposition 14.
There is a bijection between the tuples in X (X sim ) and the tuples in Z (Z sim )
Proof. Naturally, each tuple in X (X sim ) corresponds to at least one tuple in Z (Z sim ), since it is A's view of the tuple in Z (Z sim ). Now, each tuple in X (X sim ) has at most one * in each r-subtuple. But each of those can only be completed in one way, since the sum of the values in each r-tuple is determined. (For instance, for the r-subtuple of initial shares, the sum is d (0).) Thus there is at most one tuple in Z (Z sim ) that can correspond to the tuple in X (X sim ).
The following lemma completes the proof by showing that diff(X, X sim ) is sub-polynomial.
Proof. LetX be the distribution X restricted to the case where d is not in the range
We will use the fact that inX andX sim , d mod λ(N ) is uniform for both the actual protocol and the simulation.
Recall that ρ = Nm 2 r 2 cψ(η). The probability distribution on tuples generated byẐ is uniform, meaning each tuple is generated with exactly the same probability. The same holds forX,Ẑ sim andX sim . Say a tuple is an unmatchedX tuple if it is inX \X sim , and a tuple is an unmatchedX sim tuple if it is inX sim \X. Finally say a tuple is unmatched if it is an unmatchedX tuple or an unmatchedX sim tuple. Then diff(X,X sim ) is the number of unmatched tuples multiplied by the probability of a given tuple. Note that by symmetry, the number of unmatched tuples will be twice the number of unmatchedX tuples, so diff(X,X sim ) can be calculated by simply doubling the fraction of unmatchedX tuples. In what follows, we will find an upper bound on the fraction of unmatched X tuples.
To determine if a tuple v ∈X is an unmatchedX tuple, we determine whether each * in v could be replaced by a value to produce a tuple inẐ sim . Remember that there could be at most one tuple inẐ sim that corresponds to v. Basically, we can replace any * in v using the following procedure: Say v z is the tuple inẐ corresponding to v, and let x be the value at the location of the * in
. If the * is in an r-subtuple of companion shares or shares of companion shares, then replace the * with x − ∆. If the * is in an r-subtuple of shares or shares of shares, replace the * with x − d. Note that the only way we do not end up with a tuple inẐ sim is (1) if we replace a * in one of the first r − 1 shares of the r-subtuple of shares at period 0 with a number not in the range [−ρ, ρ] , (1') if we replace a * in one of the first r − 1 companion shares of an r-subtuple of companion shares at period 0 with a number not in the range [−Nρ, Nρ] , (2) if we replace a * in one of the first r −1 positions of an r-subtuple of update shares with a number not in the range [−ρ(t + 1) 2 , ρ(t + 1) 2 ], or (2') if we replace a * in one of the first r − 1 positions of an r-subtuple of companion update shares with a number not in the range 2 , Nρ(t + 1) 2 ]. Say an r-subtuple is discriminating one of these cases holds. (1) and (2) To get a bound on the fraction of unmatched X tuples, we can place an upper bound on the fraction of tuples containing discriminating r-subtuples.
For each r-subtuple containing shares, for each position with a given value α, there are (2ρ) r−2 r-subtuples. For each r-subtuple containing companion shares, for each position with a given value α, there are (2Nρ) r−2 r-subtuples. For each r-subtuple containing shares of shares from period 2t + 1, for each position with a given value α, there are (2ρ(t + 1)
2 ) r−2 r-subtuples. For each r-subtuple containing shares of companion shares from period 2t + 1, for each position with a given value α, there are (2Nρ(t + 1)
2 ) r−2 r-subtuples. To simplify the computation of the upper bound we desire, we will count each tuple with more than one discriminating r-subtuple multiple times, once for each discriminating r-subtuple. The fraction of tuples with discriminating subtuples is then bounded by
Then diff(X,X sim ) can be bounded by twice that number, which can be simplified to:
This ends the proof of Lemma 11. Proof. This follows directly from [BeHa92] .
Simulation with
Proof of the Theorem Now we finish the proof of Theorem 8. Let η be the security parameter, and let GE be the key generator described in the definition of a (k , k, l)-secure proactive RSA system. Assume that the Adaptive Protocol (call it S) is not a (k , k, l)-secure proactive RSA system.
Then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time (k , k, l)-restricted fully adaptive adversary A, and a polynomial-time function A such that for a list L of randomly chosen messages submitted to be signed, Pr
)] is non-negligible. However, no polynomial-time function A could compute a signature u for a random challenge message w ∈ R {0, 1}
h with more than negligible probability given only view sim(e,N,A,H,g,h) A,L and then produce the desired α and β contradicting Lemma 10.
Therefore (still assuming the system is not secure), one could construct a distinguisher between view sim(e,N,A,H,g,h)
A,L and view S(e,d,N,g,h) A,L , which contradicts Lemma 16. Thus S must be (k , k, l)-secure.
Robustness of the Adaptively-Secure Protocol
For a public RSA modulus N and two generators g, h ∈ Z * N , we say that one breaks (g, h, N ) if one finds α and β with (α = 0)
In the following definitions, for each good committee C i,j , we only consider the a 2t i,j and w 2t i,j values agreed on by the good servers in C i,j , if they exist. We say a proactive RSA system is correct at period
i,j mod λ(N ) for all good families F i . We say a proactive RSA system is verifiable at period 2t if for each good committee Proof. The basic idea is to show that if the system is not correct, verifiable, and compact at a specific time t, then there is a polynomial-time function A that can sign a random message w, or break (g, h, N ), using as input the adversary's view of the protocol, thus breaking the security of the system. By Theorem 8 this happens with negligible probability. We prove the lemma by induction on t. We will prove results related to the a For the inductive step, we will show correctness, verifiability, and compactness for each good family F i . Note that the shares of a family F i can change only during the Share Renewal/Lost Share Recovery Protocol. Let F i be the family used by F i in update period 2t − 1 to construct the shares {a (g, h, N ) , and thus the security of the system. This implies correctness at period 2t for family F i .
For compactness, we first show that unless the system has been broken, Proof. Recall that by Lemma 7, with all but negligible probability, the assignment is (k , k, l)-terrific, and thus 90 percent of the families will be good in any period 2t.
Note that the gateway G is given the outputs of all the committees in all the families, the opened shares at the committees with disputed outputs, and the public witnesses {b 2t i,j } (i,j)∈I×J . It can easily be verified (using the fact that at least one family is good in any operational period 2t) that correctness, verifiability, compactness, and availability imply robustness.
Lemma 17 proves that with overwhelming probability, the system is correct, verifiable, and compact during each operational period 2t. Then for each committee C i,j with bad servers, our protocol allows a good server on that committee to prove its partial signature to be correct (by opening the sharesã 2t i,j andw 2t i,j and verifying them using the public valueb 2t i,j , if there is a dispute). Thus, a gateway G can efficiently identify or compute a correct partial signature for each committee C i,j with a good server. Consequently, it can efficiently identify a good family and compute the correct signature. This implies availability at time 2t.
Thus the system is (k , k, l)-robust.
